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ELIMINATION OF GENERAL VERDICTS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO
JuRIES.--General and aggravated criticism of the courts of our
land in late years has induced the preparation of this paper.
It is a rare thing when one can pick up a law journal with-

out discovering in it somewhere a criticism of the procedure
in our courts -having to do with their inefficiency, touching

their unreasonably expensive methods, bias and prejudice
of juries, their uncertainty in obtaining justice, substitution
of arbitration in lieu of courts, general dissatisfaction with
the jury system, going to the extent of advocating the abolition of juries especially in civil cases. These complaints
come not only from litigants, but from the public, the press
and lawyers themselves, and even the courts. Is it not high

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1927

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1927], Art. 6
EDITORIAL NOTES

time that something of a constructive nature be done to
correct the situation? Prolonged criticism of the courts
has tended to cheapen them, and to bring them and the bar
in disrepute, and will continue to do so unless a remedy is
found. To remedy the situation, an analysis must be made
to determine where the real or greatest faults lie in our
procedure.
In the first place, it might be mentioned that there appears to be very little, if any, criticism directed at the
courts or the bar so far as the procedure in chancery causes
is concerned. It has been confined to law cases wherein
there are jury trials. Recently may be noted suggestions
of reverting to the practice in many European countries
where cases are tried without a jury by the courts. Another suggestion is the trying of law cases with three
judges sitting together, drawn from districts outside of the
locality where they live, to take the place of a jury. This
latter method, of course, would involve the changing of our
constitution, and people would be reluctant to make so
radical a change as to do away altogether, in the near
future, with juries in law cases. The remedy, therefore.
must lie, for the present at least, in reorganizing our present system and injecting new methods in it to eliminate delays, numerous trials and resultant unnecessary expenses,
and in simplifying the work of juries. Past President,
Kemble White, in his annual address before the West
Virginia Bar Association in 1925, had this to say: "It will
be found upon investigation that a large percentage of
reversals in the Supreme Court result not from the erroneous exclusion of evidence offered, nor from improper
evidence admitted * * * * * but from the erroneous instructions propounded." In the same volume of the report
of the Bar Association meeting for 1925, is the report of
the Criminal Law Committee of 417 criminal cases examined,
from volume 42 to 97 inclusive of the West Virginia Reports, showing that of those cases 256 were reversed and
161 affirmed. Of the 256 reversed, 87 cases, or 33%, were
reversed on account of instructions. Sixty of these cases,
or 25%, were reversed because the evidence was insufficient. Four were reversed on account of defect in the
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-verdict. In short, 60% of those cases reversed need not
have been sent back for a new trial if the juries had been
required in them to answer only interrogatories and not
render a general verdict; in other words, if the juries had
only been required to decide the facts in the case rather
An examination of Vol. 98 of
-than the whole case itself.
our West Virginia Reports, picked at random from the others,
reveals that there were 42 civil cases in that volume that
had actually been tried by a jury. Twenty of those had
been affirmed. Six were reversed for reasons not involving instructions, and the other 16 were reversed because of the erroneous instructions. It is safe to say that
-in examination of all cases reversed by higher courts will
reveal the fact that 60 to 75% of them have been reversed
because of improper instructions, or because the jury decided the case contrary to the law and the evidence.
It is elementary that juries should decide the facts and
the courts decide the law, but when, as it often occurs, the
courts and lawyers do not always know the law during the
trial of a case, and juries are improperly instructed, or probably not instructed at all, on vital points, it is not surprising
that under our present system, cases involving large
amounts should be tried as many as three times in the lower
court and twice in the Supreme Court, due to error in instructions, or a misapplication of the law to the facts by
Juries. It is a fact, as Past President White pointed out in
his address, that, "as many as forty or fifty instructions are
often given in one case, and if the papers containing such
instructions were taken from the court room, neither counsel nor the court, relying on memory, could even approximate a fair reproduction of the abstruse distinctions attempted to be made by the formulas read." Instructions to
juries are not understood by juries. They are merely devices which lawyers are forced to adopt to obtain errors
and reversals contrary to their own wishes and the
wishes of the bar and courts in general, but it is all in the
game, because it is permitted and the other fellow does it.
JIs it any wonder that the public and the bar have become
disgusted and that litigants put the blame on the lawyers
that they are trying to earn larger fees by trying cases over
so often? If a case is so close of decision that it may be
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decided a couple of times for each party before a finality
so that the winner in the-end is also the loser, would it not
be better to gamble with chance just one time and actually
have something left to the winner, than to gamble "the best
two out of three" and have the winnings eaten up in several expensive trials?
My suggestion is to do away with instructions, except
the usual one on the credibility of witnesses and have the
jury decide only questions of facts submitted to them by
interrogatories and eliminate general verdicts altogether.
Once these facts are decided by a jury, the court, which is
the logical agency to do so, can then apply the law. There
should then be no further occasion for submitting the case
to a jury if the interrogatories submitted cover the material
issues or facts in the case. On questions of materiality or
irrelevancy of evidence, the courts should be liberal in admission of such evidence, and should immaterial interrogatories be submitted and answered no harm is done. In
fact there is no reason why litigants should not then be
permitted to have the jury answer any number of questions,
whether the lower court itself thinks they are material or
not. The Supreme Court may think otherwise, and if so,
judgment may be entered by it without a new trial in nearly
all cases. Under such a system, the possibility of a new
jury trial could arise in only two instances: 1. Where
the jury is unable to agree. 2. Where the court refuses or
fails to propound material interrogatories. Where a jury
answers interrogatories inconsistently, it might be provided
that such inconsistency could be called to the jury's attention and it be then given an opportunity to reconcile its
answers before being dismissed. Once the facts are thus
determined on interrogatories without a general verdict,
the lower court would apply the law. The Supreme Court
would then say whether it had been properly applied to the
facts which had been determined, and if it had not been
properly applied by the lower court, then and there the
Supreme Court would apply it and end the case.
There is no particular reason why courts should not decide the facts in law cases as well as in chancery cases.
Our chancery procedure certainly works more satisfactorily than does our law procedure, and is much less subject
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to criticism, but tradition and usage have made jury trials
inherently a part of our government so much so it would
be extremely difficult to eliminate jury trials in this country.
For the present at least, if ever, it would not be advisable to
eliminate general verdicts in criminal cases by substituting
interrogatories in lieu thereof. This might come later,
however, but in civil cases, there is no good reason why the
plan would not be workable, and much preferable to the
present plan where juries can render answers to certain
interrogatories which are inconsistent with the general verdict, when many times the general verdict is more often
the mere expression of the wish or desire of the jury rather
than its conclusions based on the evidence. More frequently than not, juries disregard instructions altogether,
and where there is evidence sufficient to permit the court
to let the jury decide the case, the jury decides it not according to the law propounded, nor the preponderance of
the evidence, but according to its sympathies, or its own
interest as applied to the particular question involved, or
the views of one or a few individual jurors who can argue
the meaning of the court's instructions better than the
other jurors. Inquiry after the verdict often reveals that
the jury's decision rested on an erroneous construction of
the instructions or on some point of law or evidence that
neither the court nor the attorneys thought was controlling, or that should have entered into a consideration of the
case. It is wrong in principle for juries both to decide the
facts and apply the law to the facts. As long as lawyers
and courts who are supposed to be learned in the law have
difficulty in applying the law to the facts, how can it be
expected that juries can do so intelligently? It is confusing
for them to attempt it, especially where there are many
instructions involving many distinctions of law and many
applications of it. Interrogatories would take away from
the jury the application of the law to the facts, which
would simplify their work by directing their attention to
the real issues, the facts in the case, and would eliminate
any chance of juries being misled by attorneys arguing to
them, and misleading them with, irrelevant and immaterial
matters injected into the arguments. It would simplify and
shorten the argument of the lawyers requiring them only
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to argue the facts and not the law. It would shorten and
simplify the work of the jury for the same reasons, and
make it possible for the court to shorten the trial of the
case, all of which would tend to cut down the expense of
the courts.
The time does not seem remote when the public will require a change in our jury system, possibly to the extent
of the elimination of juries altogether by constitutional
methods in civil cases. This might be going too far. It
would be better to make our changes gradually rather than
radically. The elimination of instructions to juries and the
substitution of interrogatories without the general verdict
is such a gradual change in our system as might prevent any
radical changes later looking to the abolition of juries
altogether.
-THOMAS
H. S. CuRD
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